Genetic engineering and human mental ecology:Interlocking effects and educational considerations by Affifi, Ramsey
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genetic engineering and human mental ecology
Citation for published version:
Affifi, R 2017, 'Genetic engineering and human mental ecology: Interlocking effects and educational
considerations' Biosemiotics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1-24. DOI: 10.1007/s12304-017-9286-7
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s12304-017-9286-7
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Biosemiotics
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Aug. 2019
ORIGINAL PAPER Open Access
Genetic Engineering and Human Mental Ecology:
Interlocking Effects and Educational Considerations
Ramsey Affifi1
Received: 12 September 2016 /Accepted: 2 March 2017
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper describes some likely semiotic consequences of genetic
engineering on what Gregory Bateson has called Bthe mental ecology^ (1979) of
future humans, consequences that are less often raised in discussions surrounding
the safety of GMOs (genetically modified organisms). The effects are as follows:
an increased 1) habituation to the presence of GMOs in the environment, 2)
normalization of empirically false assumptions grounding genetic reductionism,
3) acceptance that humans are capable and entitled to decide what constitutes an
evolutionary improvement for a species, 4) perception that the main source of
creativity and problem solving in the biosphere is anthropogenic. Though there are
some tensions between them, these effects tend to produce self-validating webs of
ideas, actions, and environments, which may reinforce destructive habits of
thought. Humans are unlikely to safely develop genetic technologies without
confronting these escalating processes directly. Intervening in this mental ecology
presents distinct challenges for educators, as will be discussed.
Keywords Genetic engineering education . Genetics education . Second-order
cybernetics . Sustainability.GregoryBateson .Mental ecology.Mental ecology.Ecology
ofmind . Hubris . Reverence
Introduction
Intervening directly in genomes, by inserting, creating, or altering the function of
genetic material, is often seen as the basis of the next industrial revolution (Church
and Regis 2012; Dyson 2007). Promised is a new economy unlimited in capacity to
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further human health, comfort, and prosperity. The actual and potential applications of
such genetic interventions are tremendous, as much for the life sciences as for com-
merce more generally. Genetic engineering has already been used to mass-produce
cheap insulin for diabetics, human growth hormones, antibodies, anti-hemophilic
factors, and vaccines. It may fruitfully produce biofuels, remediate contaminated areas,
and generate bacteria that can detect toxins such as arsenic in water. Furthermore,
recent genetic engineering procedures, such as CRISPR cas9 gene editing, are much
easier and powerful in scope, and are widely recognized as an industry Bgame changer^
in what is already a game changing industry. Regardless of whether such advancements
live up to their hype, these moderate gains already present society with powerful tools.
Nevertheless, genetic technologies have faced considerable backlash from environ-
mentalists and food and health advocates, which has probably slowed commercializa-
tion in some sectors.1 Those concerned often cite Bpotential risks^ and call for the
Bprecautionary principle^, which maintains that humans should wait until a new
technology is reasonably shown to be safe before using or commercializing it (see
O'Riordan and Cameron 1994). Such a requirement seem untenable to proponents
because technology (or any activity for that matter) has always proceeded with un-
known risks. Genetic engineering is no different on this account, and should not
therefore require more regulation or scrutiny than other human activities. As is often
pointed out, it cannot be proven that we will not be hit by a car when crossing the street
but this does not (nor should it) prevent us from crossing. The precautionary principle is
probably inherently self-contradictory because not doing something often has its own
risks and would require evidence prior to its own implementation (Mandal and Gathii
2006). As agricultural economist Jayson Lusk expressed it: BThere are risks with these
technologies, there are risks with every technology. There are also risks with not
approving these technologies^ (CBC News 2015).
Whether and in what conditions the precautionary principle is tenable is an impor-
tant discussion, but it is not the only way to think about genetic technologies. The
approach adopted in this paper does not appeal to threatening unknowns. It instead
articulates some semiotic effects likely to occur through the increasing use of engineer-
ing practices and metaphors applied to modifying life. I hope to show that thinking
about other organisms in engineering terms leads to human activities that profoundly
transforms our sense of what it means to be Bhuman^ and our understanding of
Bnature.^ This transformation entails major risks that cannot be simply cast aside as
anti-scientific doomsday prophesying. As we shall see, the unreflective normalization
of genetic engineering leads directly to the perpetual re-creation of increasingly vast
parts of the biological world, at once exacerbating an ecological and a Bspiritual^ crisis.
This is because at the same time as increasing numbers of novel organisms are
introduced into already degraded and resilience-compromised ecosystems, our experi-
ence of natural beauty, complexity, and creativity is progressively replaced with signs
of human ingenuity, purposefulness, and, when things go wrong, error. While a concern
with the semiosis of humans and nature seems but philosophical extravagance, I
maintain that a sense of wonder and appreciation of the nonhuman world is not a
1 With the advent of gene editing techniques such as CRISPR cas9, there is considerably more momentum and
it is unclear whether traditional forms of activism will continue to have a consequential impact on commer-
cialization rates.
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bourgeois or romantic fantasy but an essential part of experience that we must cherish
and nurture. This does not necessarily mean banning all applications of genetic
engineering, but it does imply developing a strong understanding of what grounds
and supports our lives, physically, emotionally, spiritually, and aesthetically, and
the courage to allow these factors to inform our science policy and practice.
Science and environmental educators need to be aware of and sensitive to these
possible consequences and to take the necessary steps to prevent undesirable
effects.2
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first describe a framework developed by
semiotician and cybernetician Gregory Bateson known as Bmental ecology^ (1972;
1979), which is fruitful for understanding how metaphors (such as Bengineering^ life)
influence and spread. I then employ this framework to describe some effects of genetic
engineering that interlock in potentially harmful ways. For the scope of this paper, I
focus on four forms of habituation that are already underway but are expected to
sharply increase. These are habituation to 1) GMOs as a normal presence in our
environments, 2) the idea that organisms are programmed by atomistic pieces of code,
3) the sense that gene-level changes to humans and other species are improvements,
and 4) the sense that creativity is something uniquely and ubiquitously human. These
forms of habituation occur independently of whether or not GMOs are harmful or
beneficial in any particular application. As such, they necessarily slip past current
regulatory schemes. If such aggregating habituations are likely to lead to dangerous
outcomes, we must examine what are our possibilities for averting such harm. Science
educators at all levels play an important role in addressing this challenge and specific
educational implications will be discussed in the final section of the paper.
Batesonian Minds
This paper is concerned foremost with the effects of genetic engineering on how we
think, how semiotic shifts alter our actions and thereby our environments, and what
considerations can be made by educators wishing to engage in this process. I am guided
here by a Batesonian approach to thinking about problematic semiotic trends and
dynamics associated with genetic engineering. By BBatesonian,^ I mean that it aligns
with a general pattern of thought that Gregory Bateson struggled to develop during his
lifetime for thinking about ecological phenomena as diverse as biological ecosystems,
addiction, disease, and human relationships. After briefly sketching this out, I will
apply some of his ecological thinking to helping clarify the dynamics of semiosis in the
age of genetic engineering.
Bateson defined Bmind^ functionally as a process that occurs given certain types of
organization and he sought to articulate the basic aspects of that organization. The details
of his proposal do not matter for this paper (see Bateson 1979), but what is essential here
is that he considered mind not to operate in the brain or even in the body (as Freudians
2 I consider all readers of this journal to be science educators in some loose sense. Most are in academia and
work with students. Those who do not are still engaged in multiple informal learning relationships in their
daily lives within which values and attitudes about science are constantly implicit. The fact that the distinction
between educator and non-educator has been institutionalized does not change the fact that there are pervasive
educative dimensions to sociocultural experience.
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had extended it) but rather to be located in a broader or extended system that he
described as Borganism plus environment.^ An animal, for example, is continuously
engaging its Bexternal^ world by picking up information through its senses, which gets
translated by sensory organs, creating new information for nerve cells, and so on, until it
reaches the brain and gradually makes its way to the motor organs to create some sort of
change in the relationship between the organism and that stimulus in its environment.
What is going on at each stage is a response to difference (i.e. the stimulus in the external
environment was created by distinguishing it against a context, which thereby elicited a
difference in the sensory organ that similarly spurred another difference in the nerve cell
it communicated with, and so on, ending with the organism creating some difference in
its relationship with its environment), so minds can be considered as systems set up to
respond to and circulate difference. And, because the system is set up in a circular way
(since the motor changes alter the environment that the organism is capable of
responding to, re-constitute the stimulus, and change it in the next cycle), Bateson’s
basic characterization is that a mind is a recursive system that constitutes and responds to
differences. Finally, for Bateson, a mind is also hierarchically organized. It is not a single
recursive system, but a recursive system regulated by other recursive systems that are
responding to differences in it (this is why Bateson explained that organisms do not
merely Blearn^ but Blearn to learn^ and sometimes even Blearn to learn to learn^ (see
Bateson’s discussion on levels of learning (1972: 279–308)).
Mind, in a Batesonian sense, is ubiquitous across the biological world, from single
cells to multicellular organisms, to ecosystems. As recursive systems, some machines
(such as thermostats) are also mental, though insofar as they have no hierarchy of
recursion (and therefore no learning) they are better thought of as proto-mental.
Importantly, for Bateson mind is not necessarily Bconscious,^ in the self-referential
sense of being aware that it is aware.3
For Bateson, minds can be Bhealthy^ or Bpathological^ depending on how their
ongoing responsiveness to information affects their relationship with their larger
interdependencies. Pathology occurs when a mind responds to its environment by
making (or failing to make) distinctions resulting in the reduced viability of the
Borganism plus environment^ system. Because these distinctions are epistemological,
pathology is considered an Berror.^ When errors circulate through recursive systems
they can become self-validating: the organism modifies its environment based on
whatever distinctions it has made and the errors get reified (i.e. the environment now
embeds these errors physically into itself, which the organism interprets as evidence
that its interpretation is valid). This is why in an important article on alcoholism,
Bateson (1972) describes addiction as an Bepistemological^ problem created and
exacerbated by an incorrect way of understanding oneself and one’s capacities, an
3 Bateson suggests that Bconsciousness^ occurs only in mental systems that become aware of the ‘product’ of
their perception without being aware of the process that led to that perceptual product. It is by nature
fragmentary because the conscious experience does not have access to the entire mental circuit in which it
is dependent and embedded, and as a result it tends to systematically distort its understanding of how its own
mental system is organized. For example, because of this fragmentary understanding, conscious organisms
tend to interpret themselves as causal agents in a simplistically linear way because that is how their experience
is disclosed to them. One point of this article is to show that the appearance of causality in genetically
engineered organisms perpetuates this linear conception of mind, which is a misleading product of
consciousness.
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error which gets re-enforced by how a person and her physical and social environments
reciprocally interlock as the disease progresses.
Such self-validating processes are called Bpositive^ or Brunaway^ feedback loops.
Positive feedback loops are not sustainable in ecosystems because they increase a
subset of variables at the expense of other essential variables. Such subsystems insulate
themselves against buffering, so rapid growth follows but so does disruption of the
surrounding system, leading to loss of function, versatility, or resilience of the system
as a whole. Because the larger context of the runaway subsystem cannot support
indefinite expansion, the subsystem is eventually either dampened by the larger system
(like how the population growth of a herbivore is subsequently buffered by the growth
of its predator) or it destroys the larger system entirely (such as some cancers). It is for
this reason that Bateson considered uncontrolled positive feedback loops as patholog-
ical. And Bhealth^ is conversely related to attenuating or reversing runaway feedback
loops occurring in mental systems, which is perhaps why healthy ecosystems (and
people) are said to be Bbalanced.^ In healthy mental systems various recursive feedback
loops govern one another preventing any from ever-escalating positive feedback. When
discussing aspects and outcomes of positive and negative feedback loops, Bateson is
often explicitly concerned with the semiotic dynamics of human mental ecologies. This
is evident, for example in his discussion of the mutual reinforcement of hubris and
technology (Bateson 1972). Bateson’s concern with semiosis is broader and more
systemic than Peirce who tends to be concerned with particular rather than global
semiotic events.
The purpose of this essay is twofold: 1) to uncover how the engineering metaphor
applied to living systems leads to several positive feedback loops, and 2) to examine
how educators can assist in balancing these runaways. As we shall see, particular
positive feedback loops emerge that reinforce problematic ways of understanding and
acting towards other species. 4 Insofar as these feedback loops lose flexibility and
insulate against correction, they are pathological for humans and other species in-
volved. I examine four such interlocking loops in this paper but also identify some
limitations to my analysis. We ought to develop a society that can scrutinize genetic
engineering carefully so I discuss pedagogical issues involved with meeting this end in
the final section of the paper.
Habituation to GMOs in our Environment
The first feedback loop associated with the development of GMOs discussed is so
simple that it seems to hardly deserve investigation. It is this: the more GMOs are
present in our environment, the more people get used to them being there, and the less
likely they will be to remain sensitive to their presence. Organisms habituate to what
they are immersed in, rendering constant inputs or stimuli a part of their background
context. Novel things settle into the subconscious, the body and mind develop habits to
deal with them, and thinking moves on to handle other things. From a Batesonian
4 Of course, some of the patterns identified here are not solely the product of genetic engineering, but of the
general system of ideas that facilitated the emergence of genetic engineering – which it then serves to further
entrench. This dimension will be discussed in what follows.
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perspective, habituation to accumulating factors means that difference (or information)
is not circulating within the mental system, not effecting perceptual-motor adjustments,
and what could drive action becomes increasingly treated as Bcontext^. Bateson
recognized that this process was inherent in our capacity to learn. For example, it is
only because humans are able to see similar things as identical that we can form classes
or categories, which we use to make distinctions. While this produces conceptual
blocks that enable thinking, it is a double-edged sword with clear shortcomings:
Bprecisely because the mind can receive news only of difference, there is difficulty in
discriminating between a slow change and a state. There is necessarily a threshold
gradient below which gradient cannot be perceived^ (Bateson 1979: 98). The educa-
tional challenge is therefore a semiotic one: to help students develop skills to treat
individual cases as suchwhen needed and to circumvent the tendency to categorize and
overlook difference.
Habituation is self-validating. Or, as essayist George Monbiot puts it in the context
of the ecological crisis in general, Bwith each subtle intensification, the baseline of
normality shifts^ (2015). Once some GMOs are accepted in our environment, their
precedence facilitates the introduction of others. This happens on a microscale (for
example, most new agricultural GMOs that have been approved since the public’s
initial swell of concern in the late 1990s have been new varieties of species already
genetically engineered (such as corn, soy, and cotton products)). But it also happens on
a broader scale, as each new GMO paves the way for the likelihood of further GMOs,
with the upcoming approval of GMO salmon in the United States expediting the
approval of other genetically engineered animals, and so on.5
Currently, most GMOs involve the introduction of relatively little transgenic or
edited DNA, a point continuously identified by proponents (for example, see Folta
2012). However, what needs to be critically evaluated is the cumulative effect
microscale interventions have on the normalization of the technology, and in
particular on shifting public acceptance with respect to living in a genetically
engineered world. Once accepted, there is only an incremental difference between
the insertion or editing of 1–3 genes and the modification of 5–10 genes, or
between engineering a few domesticated food crops and engineering wild species
writ large. Meanwhile, genetic interventions continue to become increasingly
powerful. For instance, CRISPR-Cas9 technology now enables scientists to re-
move, insert, and modify genetic material much more easily than in the past, when
trial-and-error insertions through firing genes into DNA, or inducing infections
using viral or bacterial components as vectors, was common (Pennisi 2013).
Chinese scientists recently used CRISPR editing technology to modify nonviable
human embryos (Liang et al. 2015), and the National Academy of Sciences (2017)
has recently recommended human gene editing for certain medical treatments.
5 Meanwhile, risk assessment methods, rigor and objectivity are biased by habituation. This phenomenon has
occurred with many technologies in the past. Once habituation occurs, only a disaster is likely to respark initial
concerns (as with the response to Fukushima), − and even then it is likely to be schematized as an exceptional
event that ultimately does not shake the logic or rationale behind the continued deployment of the technology.
Humans are much less capable of seeing how the things they are immersed in affect them and this
psychological fact should be put at the forefront of any risk assessment so that people can explicitly correct
for this automated bias when designing methods to evaluate and take precautions for new and existing
technologies.
Affifi R.
Further, with Bgene drives^ scientists can now seed populations of organisms with
small quantities of genetically altered organisms produced to ensure the spread of
the novel DNA material regardless of whether it confers a benefit or a liability on
the organisms (Oye et al. 2014). That these ideas do not bat an eye now indicate
that Batesonian shifting baseline effects are well underway.
There is only a continuous series of incremental differences between single-gene
deletions and biotech entrepreneur Craig Venter’s age of Bdigital life^ (2013), an
anticipated stage when humans will purportedly be able to accelerate biological
evolution up to the same rate as social evolution – which basically means transforming
life at the rate of the development of thought itself. 6 Unless the tendency towards
habituation is explicitly addressed by educators, the acceptance of the technology will
likely increase nonlinearly as the most fundamental ethical or existential questions (to
accept genetic intervention or not) recede into the background through the acceptance
of the initial GMO crops. An additional factor in this mental ecology is that precedence-
setting is such a powerful process in human mental ecologies that it is sometimes
considered explicitly in pedagogical recommendations aimed at fostering societal
acceptance of genetic engineering. Freeman Dyson (2007) has us imagine that debate
about biotechnology could be greatly attenuated if educators designed Bbiotech games^
for children so that they could Bintimately^ interact with GMOs by growing up
modifying other organisms for the sake of curiosity or competition. The same argument
is put forward by Biofortified (Coatney 2013), which claims that do-it-yourself (DIY)
biotech will push genetic engineering into public acceptance.
Once considered a powerful practice reserved for curing disease, genetic
engineering has now been taken up by artists (who are often funded by univer-
sity biology departments). For the purposes of provocation or beauty, the world
now has Eduardo Kac’s rabbit engineered to glow in the dark, and the Bcactus
project,^ a cactus engineered to produce human hair instead of thorns. There are
now dozens of organizations and centres devoted to exploring transgenic organ-
isms as art. At the same time, synthetic biology projects are now fundraising
through online crowdsourcing websites such as Kickstarter, and do-it-yourself
GMO organizations (such as Biocurious and DIYBIO) are setting up
Bcommunity biology^ groups for collaboratively participating in, and sharing
experiences about genetically engineering other species. In addition, an interna-
tional competition called iGEM has groups of high school and college students
across the world compete against each other for yearly awards honouring the
most interesting or innovative transgenic designs and biotechnologies. While
some of these projects may serve vital human needs, as a whole they indicate
an engineering attitude towards other organisms employed for increasingly friv-
olous purposes.
Is this normalization trend problematic? Clearly many biologists think not, but it is
important to consider what is at stake. The invitation is to clearly understand what we
6 Whether or not ecosystems can support such radically discontinuous shifts in rates of change is a serious
question. Organisms expect patterns of behaviour, and all evolution so far has been co-evolution. It is not clear
that a breach in co-evolutionary processes is ecologically stable (see Wills (2001) for a discussion of the
disrupting effects of genetic engineering on evolutionary processes). According to some models, at some point
natural selection itself breaks down when the rate of novelty generation passes a threshold above which
selection becomes impossible (Nowak and Schuster 1989).
Genetic Engineering and Human Mental Ecology
are becoming accustomed to in our mental ecologies as well as the consequences of this
learning process. In the remainder of this section and in those following it, I shall
explore this question in greater detail.
Habituation to GMOs is clearly not habituation to a purely physical environmental
novelty, such as occurs to a change of temperature. It is unlikely that most of us would
recognize most GMOs if encountered untold. Instead, it is at once perceptual and
conceptual because it involves becoming accustomed to a set of ideas as to what GMOs
(and life in general, and we as agents) are. In the most general sense, through the
increased presence of GMOs, people become accustomed to GMOs not simply as
physical entities, but also as ideas, as complex discursive entities with growing, yet
competing understandings, with accompanying sets of attitudes, including ranges of
possible practices and posit-able futures, either of progress or doom. As the number of
ways in which we think about and articulate what GMOs Bare^ increases, we get
habituated to the notion that this very discussion or debate itself is Bnormal.^ GMOs
become normalized as a polarizing issue (like say, the abortion debate), and in so being
categorized, thereafter constrain the responsivity of people to their existence.
Normalization produces a relationality between attitudes that tends to produce a pattern
of social relationships rather than precise behaviours.
In any case, the normalization of discourse is the most significant reason why there
is no Bgoing back^ to the pre-GMO days. Even if people stopped producing GMOs
entirely, the patterns of logic developed in articulating their presence and possibilities
has already inflected subsequent thinking. For example, people increasingly think that
Bgenetic modification^ is something we have been doing Ball along^, as they retroac-
tively reconceptualise the process of selective breeding under this new frame.
Domesticated animals are now commonly reconceived as artefactual because their past
was marked by their being bred by or for us. This is a common bait-and-switch
manoeuver by which humans make sense of their worlds. It is why Habermas argued
that the Bfloodgate^ or Bslippery slope^ argument is, in the cases of genetic engineer-
ing, valid: Baccidental precedents and inconspicuous practices which [...] have become
ingrained through normalization are retrospectively exploited, by those lobbying for
genetic engineering and biotechnology, in order to shrug off moral misgivings as ‘too
late’^ (Habermas 2003: 19). Hence, we must learn to imagine and confront the semiotic
evolution of possible technologies and their cumulative effects on our mental ecologies.
The problem is not simply that there are powerful lobby groups behind this
retroactive reconceptualization, as Habermas has suggested.7 This retrofitting process
is expected by the manner mental ecologies incorporate novelty. In the economy of
mental ecologies, ideas that survive repeated use are more likely to be re-used (Bateson
1972: 509). Engineering metaphors, once applied to life, eventually come to be used in
understanding not only our developing interactions with other organisms but our past
and future interactions with them as well. In mental ecosystems, subsuming novelty
under existing concepts is economical and necessary. As necessary as it is, without the
complementary capacity to uncover and insulate against the effects of deleterious
mental trends, we risk exacerbating these positive feedback loops. As mentioned,
Bateson was aware that positive feedback loops are not sustainable because they tend
7 Ignoring for the moment that corporations actively work to conflate processes to generate product acceptance
amongst the wary.
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to propagate a subset of interactants at the expense of a web of relations that these
interactants depend upon. It will clearly be less painful for humans to buffer their
activities through anticipating and avoiding systemic disturbance than letting the
system as a whole buffer these activities later on. Education is critical to this process.
In the following sections, I will deal with more specific aspects of what is normal-
ized laterally beyond GMOs as a set of concepts and discussions. However, as such an
object of discourse, the term GMO establishes the context for the other forms of
feedback discussed in this paper.
Spreading the Doctrine of Genetic Reductionism
In philosophy of science, there are many varieties of ontological, epistemological, and
methodological reductionism. Ontological reductionism is the position that any higher
level property is but the sum of underlying interactions on some lower level.
Methodological reductionism asserts that reductionist explanatory strategies and re-
search approaches are the most effective for generating scientific knowledge.
Epistemological reductionism understands reduction as essential to the meaning and
process of knowing. Most lay attempts to describe the relationship between genes and
organisms appeal to some form of ontological reduction, even though many scientists
(when pressed on the matter) will agree that genetic reduction is at best methodological.
8
For instance, assumptions about ontological reduction are apparent in how compa-
nies and the media describe drought resistant crops created by taking genes Bfor^
drought resistance and putting them in new plants. Despite this shorthand way of
speaking, a very different ontology has emerged about the relationship between genes,
organisms, and environments. It is well-recognized that the informational value of
genes is determined and continually readjusted by the organism itself, highlighting the
fact that Bcausality^ is distributed across various levels and scales in what is also a
recursive system (Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama 2000). In other words, the infor-
mational value of genes and any other resources is determined by the ongoing semiosis
of the developing organism (Bruni 2008; Affifi 2016), and ontogenetic development is
itself mental in a Batesonian sense. With the discoveries of pleiotropy and epistasis,9
cracks in the reductionist paradigm emerged even before the rise of molecular biology,
but the full extent of the interdependency and flexible adaptivity of the genome has
really come to light in the past 10 years, with the discovery of hundreds of modes of
chromatin remodelling, alternative splicings, DNA editing, RNA censoring, complex
cis-regulating feedback networks, post-translational protein modification, etc. – all
8 Debate remains about whether it is still valuable pragmatically as a way of thinking about biotechnology
research (Barnes and Dupré 2008).
9 William Bateson (1909) coined the term Bepistatic^ to refer to the process whereby one gene on a
chromosome masks or silences the effect of another. The term Bepistasis^ has since broadened to describe
any interaction whereby two or more genes contribute to a trait. Pleiotropy was a concept originally developed
by Ludwig Plate (1910) to describe the phenomena whereby a single gene contributes to more than one trait.
Both processes were considered uncommon during much of the Modern Synthesis (although Mayr (1963) and
Wright (1968) both considered pleiotropy to be prevalent). Both are now known considered to be closer to the
rule than the exception.
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processes continually responding and re-responding to ongoing signalling changes
occurring from within the cell and from outside it (Seo and Lee 2004; Griffiths and
Stotz 2013; Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Shapiro 2011).10 In Batesonian terms, this means
that the organism is able to adjust the meaning of a gene to its context, a hierarchical
mental process which evidences Blearning to learn^ (1972).
It is ironic that twenty-first century genomics has discovered that the relation-
ship between a gene and a phenotypic trait is more complex than we could
possibly have imagined, and yet this realization is paralleled by a massive
expansion of biotech crops and technologies. The incommensurability between
knowledge (which crucially includes knowledge of the current limits of our
knowledge) and practice is often brushed aside because much of genetics research
is funded or partially funded by industry. As a result, an increasing rift is
appearing between how geneticists understand the genome and how it is explained
to the layman. Although geneticists are aware that it is rare for a gene to have a
single and context-independent function, biotech companies often rely on just this
sort of explanation when presenting their technology to the public. Biotech
companies do not say Bwe inserted a gene which usually (but not necessarily)
does X in species Y (along with an indefinite number of other things) into species
Z, where it may or may not perform X in a certain set of contexts but also will
likely do a bunch of unexpected things in its new cellular and genomic context.^
Rather, a simplistic story is told: Bthe gene that makes a firefly luminescent is
inserted into the Arabidopsis plant, and the product is a plant that now glows in
the dark.^ With the phenotype and the environment now devoid of contribution,
the way in which all are connected recursively as a Batesonian mind is hidden
from view.11 This is a typical consequence of forgetting that a methodological
reduction is methodological and not ontological. The consequences however are
vast.
There is a spectrum between those genes that are tightly and functionally integrated
with other genes (and regulatory DNA) and genes which are quite modular and (more
or less) functionally discrete. To be more specific, whether genes have interactional
10 For example, certain signals cause chromatin (the DNA-protein chain) to bend, altering the type or rate of
interactions that occur between its parts (Baker 2011). The chromatin twists and turns constantly, sometimes
folding in upon itself to close off genes so that they cannot be expressed, and sometimes putting ones that are
quite far away from one another into contact. Whether or how a gene can be said to be Bregulatory,^ i.e.
influencing the function of other genes, is itself shaped by such environmental and developmental contingen-
cies, so the distinction between regulatory and structural genes is itself context dependent. The behaviour of
genes are steered by the cellular and organismal context that they are found in. Information and control are
distributed and modified by the organism’s ongoing adaptive activities.
Evidence of Batesonian mindedness is also seen in alternative splicing (Bradbury 2005; Wu et al. 2004).
Once a gene has been transcribed into RNA, it undergoes an editing process that cuts out certain segments of
it. What is left over is called mRNA (or messenger RNA) which is then translated into polypeptides (chains of
protein) by the ribosome. Gene expression would be quite machine-like and uninteresting if it was predictable
which elements are taken out during this editing process. But, in fact, about half of human genes are capable of
producing RNAwhich can be edited in numerous ways, and sometimes (such as in neural cells) in thousands
of different ways. What this means is that a single gene is capable of being expressed in thousands of different
ways. What decides how it is being expressed is, again, the larger evolving context of the cell it is in, which
includes signal transductions coming from within and outside the cell.
11 Hence Bateson scholar Harries-Jones (2016) describes the human genome project (and this obviously also
therefore implies other genome projects as well) as one of the most extravagant wastes of money in the history
of scientific research.
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effects with one another or not is dependent on what West-Eberhard calls
Bdevelopmental switches^ (2003), internal or external changes that bring about new
pleiotropic relations between various aspects of the organism along with new mod-
ularities. Modularity is therefore not in itself an aspect of either genes or any
phenotypic trait, but is rather a contingent and context specific process by which
genes can get dissociated from one another during ontogenic development. Thus,
while anti-GMO activists may push the idea that Sewall Wright would call Buniversal
pleiotropy^ (Wright 1968) too far, arguing vacuously that Beverything affects
everything,^ what is more accurate would be to say that the absence of pleiotropy
is itself just a particular context-specific pleiotropic effect (perhaps owing to the
compartmentalization of different cell types or the heterochrony of different life stages
or polyphenisms) and not an ontological fact about the atomistic nature of the genetic
information. A gene (like an organism in the case of ecosystems) can be isolated from
its contexts for certain purposes but is not acknowledged to be an experimental
artefact. Because the more reliable interventions are always going to involve those
genes that appear to behave discretely and independently of context, the commercial-
ization and normalization of genetic engineering reproduces the assumption that this
experimental artefact is an actual entity (a Bnatural kind^ (Quine 1969)), leading
humans to more deeply believe that the universe is comprised of things operating in
relative isolation rather than in contingent co-evolution. Seeing genes as entities
operating in isolation with preset functions is therefore a case of a more general type
of thinking from which it emerged, but that it in turn solidifies. It buttresses with
analogous ontological reductions, such as ignoring of interconnectedness in ecosys-
tems and treating species in isolation. Each case is the product of assuming that the
analytic method, which was developed as a tool to glean a relationship between
empirical phenomena, is revealing an ontological distinction.
The logic associated with genetic reduction has other collateral effects on our
mental ecology. One result is that genetic atomism further reifies the epistemo-
logical notion that other objects in the universe (such as humans) are fundamen-
tally individuals. This interlocks with a number of political and social ideas
associated with atomic individualism and leads our current globalizing culture
away from a more nuanced and context-dependent understanding of the relation-
ship between modularity and integration in social relationships. It does this by
presenting an alleged example of an atomic individual, which functions as evi-
dence of the atomistic metaphysical structure of phenomena in general. A further
result is that genetic reductionism tends to prop up and shield the obsolete nature-
nurture dichotomy against attack. When genes are described as information-
bearing entities without a sensitive and ongoing responsiveness to environmental
cues, the logic of the gene and the logic of the environment are artificially kept at
distance from one another. Protecting this dichotomy is not without consequence
as it itself is tied to frameworks rationalizing dominance and supremacy of certain
people over others. A third result (and one emphasized by Kirschner and Gerhart
2005) is that genotypic novelty ends up getting described as Berror^ or Bmutation^
which becomes what philosophers call a Bblack box^, hiding the fact that the
explanandum has been shrouded by a concept that does not clarify it in any way.
If the genome is sensitively reactive to a multitude of factors from within and
outside the cell, novelty is explained through the new configurations that the
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system can undergo. Not having an adequate explanation of novelty gives crea-
tionists and intelligent design theorists a soft spot to jab that they ought not have
(see Griffiths and Stotz 2013). Finally, the assumptions underlying genetic reduc-
tionism are leading to an increased interest in sequencing DNA in order to predict
health and disease, ignoring the fact that correlations only have statistical validity
made possible by relatively stable environmental traits (Hubbard and Lewontin
1996).
Another reified disanalogy is the assumption that genetic engineering is mim-
icking and is therefore fundamentally similar to the process by which nature
generates variability for selection. Many evolutionary biologists are increasingly
adamant that it is the developing phenotype perturbed by, and actively re-adapting
to, environmental factors that is the most evolutionarily significant source of
novelty (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005; West-Eberhard 2003). An environmental
change provokes responses in organisms that are themselves variable, and whose
plastic responses have varying likelihoods of being favoured by selection. This
has lead West-Eberhard to state that Bgenes are followers in evolution^ (2003:
157) and that the gradualist adaptationist assumption that sees favourable genes
slowly make their way through a population is rarely powerful enough to have
evolutionary significance. The gradualist paradigm and the logic of genetic engi-
neering interlock to normalize the notion that causality is bottom-up and non-
contextual and that the organism’s contribution is epiphenomenal. As readers of
this journal know, such a position is no longer warranted (for the active role of
semiotic agents in evolution, see in particular Hoffmeyer and Kull 2003; Sharov
et al. 2016; Sharov 2016).
Of course, observed unanticipated side effects temper the notion of genetic reduc-
tionism. 12 However, unless the side effects are catastrophic, they are likely to be
interpreted as Bexceptions^ to the predominantly modular nature of the genome.
Further Normalizing Eugenic Thinking and Practices
The self-validation of eugenic thinking is another obvious consequence of the normal-
ization of genetic engineering and associated biotechnologies. Eugenics, or the science
of improving the race of a species, was developed as a concept by Darwin’s cousin,
Francis Galton (1904). The complex history of eugenics cannot be treated in this article.
It was fairly mainstream thinking amongst Western intellectuals and politicians in the
first few decades of the twentieth century but became offensive (at least as regards
human eugenics) once Nazi Germany began institutionalizing its practice. Although
12 The extent and scope of side effects is difficult to assess in our current research context. Innovation is
coupled with the particular socioeconomic conditions that bring it forth. In our case, these technologies are
brought about in and stimulated by intellectual patenting laws and protections that celebrate and incentivize
invention. This aggravates not only the pride and further motivation of the inventor but also fractionates the
knowledge generation process so that the side effects of genetic engineering become less widely shared and
theoretically synthesized. As each researcher or business develops its own confidential approaches, the results
of their discoveries (and mistakes) are hidden from others through mechanisms erected to protect competitive
advantage. The result is that partial and distorted understandings emerge, scattered across the globe, with very
little scientific integration that cross-talk between the researchers would surely facilitate in a different
economic context.
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many consider eugenic-type concerns with genetic engineering as absurd or inappro-
priate, this is a dimension that we should take seriously in the development of human
mental ecology.
The purpose of GMO research is to improve the species modified, where Bto
improve^ is taken to mean to change its traits in a way that is seen as desirable to
humans.13 To Bimprove^ assumes that the human is able and entitled to identify
what traits are better augmented, added, attenuated, or erased in an organism. This
assumption cannot be simply accepted without consideration of self-validating
effects. It needs to be warranted especially considering many of the features which
we consider to be an Bimprovement^ are based on very short term concerns based
on significant limitations in understanding. We are still discovering what genetic
factors are needed in an organism to ensure long-term viability (for either it or us,
or other species dependent upon it). There are therefore immediate ecological and
evolutionary concerns. Eugenics is problematic not simply because it led to
murderous implementation but because it raises the broader philosophical question
as to whether people have the right (let alone capacity) to decide what is a
Bbetter^ or a Bworse^ human and to control the process thereby. A rejection of
eugenic thinking means a deeper acknowledgement of the fact that evolution is
much more embracing of novelty emerging as the creative (stochastic) element of
the process, in contradiction to the narrow and vicious characterization of a red
tooth and claw world. Eugenic thinking is supported by the Modern Synthesis’
approach to evolutionary theory, which emphasizes the process of selection rather
than the process of variation (West-Eberhard 2003). However, this approach is
compatible with a goal-centred attitude toward evolution: instead of fostering the
conditions that ensure the spontaneous production of diversity in biological sys-
tems, effort is placed on trying to control outcomes for ends imposed on the
system by the Bselector.^
It may be argued that traditional plant breeding is eugenic as well, and it certainly
is – at least halfway. A major difference, at least from the semiotic view taken in this
paper, is that the creative step is still made Bby^ nature (i.e. we do not control what
traits emerge (even with extreme methods such as mutagenesis), we only select which
ones we desire to keep). With genetic engineering, eugenics is more comprehensive
because it includes both the engineering and development of the trait and the selection
of the organism expressing it. For this reason, it magnifies an approach to valuing and
rating other species better tempered than kindled. Our limited understanding of
ecological networks suggests that we take a magnanimous attitude towards genes,
species, and diversity, with the burden of proof placed on whoever insists that the
interconnected system can be safely reorganized. In general, we need to avoid using
past patterns of thought as precedents for allowing more extreme versions of that
thought if and when it leads to consequences that we do not desire. In other words,
because ecological studies would suggest the importance of a mental ecology that
perpetuates humility in the face of complex systems that we depend upon for survival,
we must be vigilant about safeguarding against feedback loops propagating the idea
that humans know what is better in such systems. We need to build into our mental
13 Of course, Bimprove^ can sometimes mean to deliberately make something less strong, or able or
independent from a biological point of view. See Newman’s (2013) discussion of meiogenics.
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ecology ideas that can govern and prevent destructive ideas from taking over the
conceptual landscape, and put them in a healthful balance. This will be discussed
more thoroughly in the final section on educational implications.
The fact that the National Academy of Sciences in the United States recently
published a report recommending human germ-line engineering suggests that human-
ity needs to urgently and publically discuss the semiotic effects of engineering
humans. Cosmetic interventions are currently allowed in medicine, and there is no
reason to think that a sharp line between essential and inessential human engineering
is easy to demarcate or police once the normalization process is underway.14 While
we do have some important warning stories in the mainstream (like the movie
Gattaca, dir. A. Niccol 1997), the fact that eugenics is now widespread in other
plants and animals means that it is only time before the boundary between animals
and humans is broached on a broad scale. In other words, we have already become
acclimatized to a mental ecology that normalizes eugenics as a way of seeing and
redirecting evolution. Because humans are not different Bin kind^ from other species,
incremental habituation in thinking jeopardizes the force of arguments against eugenic
approaches to improving the human germ-line (Loftis 2005).
A related concern is that the spread of genetic engineering also further propagates
and encourages an exploitative and resource-extractive conception of other species.
What opens up is a view of life where it is seen as a part of the machinery by which
market-based economies reify the system of ideas that sustains them at the expense of
the mental ecologies needed to integrate and co-evolve in the biosphere. When we
engineer cows to produce pharmaceuticals in their milk we normalize the idea that an
improved cow is not one adapted to better achieve its own potentialities (which was
arguably at least a part of Galton’s vision) but one that has been reconfigured in order
to function better in the production and extraction of resources for humans. The
biocapitalist dimension of biotechnology has been explored thoroughly so I will not
repeat it here (Shiva 1997; Pierce 2013). Once genetically engineering humans takes
place, it will occur in an economic context that will benefit those with the means to
use it, potentially entrenching and exacerbating existing inequalities. If engineering
does confer advantage, inequality founded on problematic socioeconomic conditions
would become biologically inscribed.
Relocating the Source of Creativity to Human Innovation
Increasingly, Bateson came to believe that the health of our mental ecology depends on
practices that enable us to experience that we are parts of systems much larger, more
powerful, and more complex than is consciously perceived. He thought that most
religions were Btrue^ in this way: their beliefs led to pathology error correction even
if their particular premises were scientifically nonsensical (Bateson and Bateson 2004).
14 A major reason for the NAS recommendation was that the United States could not be left behind seeing as
China and Sweden are going ahead with state funding of human engineering anyway (Harmon 2017). If China
decides to proceed with research in engineering humans for inessential traits, like increased intelligence or
physical function, it is difficult to imagine that competing countries will not now see such a research agenda as
now Bessential^.
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To be clear, Bateson’s purpose was not to rekindle some twenty-first century version of
a prior theism. He was a scientist through and through. It was rather to acknowledge
that people can only ever have a partial and situated understanding of the large,
complex processes that give rise to living ecologies – and that acknowledging this fact
is itself a necessary strategy to help avoid some of the destructive consequences
inherent in the type of intelligence we have.
The point of this section is to argue that by engineering the most complex
things in our environment (i.e. living systems), humans risk losing some of the last
mental checks available against runaway hubris. Our species has been engineering
inanimate things for a long time and in many cases has added complexity to them
(like when builders turn iron ore into a bridge). Nevertheless, engineering has,
until recently been limited to creatively re-organizing things without much internal
organization of their own. The most complex and creative processes in the
universe were left untouched and therefore so was the capacity to appreciate the
fact that such complex systems exist. A reader of a draft of this article commented
that I ought not anthropomorphize the term Bcreativity^ in this discussion. This
concern only shows how far Western societies have succeeded in stripping nature
of any adjectival dimensions that acknowledge its ongoing generative potency.
The fact that using the word Bcreativity^ to describe natural processes is no longer
allowed is part of the mental ecology that situates humans as demiurges in a world
there for manipulation.
The justification for transferring creativity to the human is packed into preva-
lent assumptions about the source of novelty in genetic evolution. As mentioned
above, our understanding of random mutation and the defensibility of genetic
engineering are mutually associated. Let’s explore this further. On the one hand,
the randomness of the process implies that genetic engineering is simply intro-
ducing one more source of variation ultimately to be culled or supported by the
process of selection. On the other, the fact that genetic engineering sometimes
works appears as proof that mutation really is random. These concepts couple to
thwart our capacity to recognize both the incompleteness of our concept of
randomness and the potential risks of genetic modifications. Not all parts of the
DNA mutate at the same rate, some parts are highly conserved, other parts highly
mutable (i.e. mutation Bhotspots^), implying that the relative capacity of various
parts of the genome to develop novelty has itself evolved (Benzer 1961). In
addition, which parts are mutable is itself flexibly adaptive depending on context
(Wright 2000, 2004). What these findings imply is that while the actual mutation
may be undirected (i.e. Bisotropic^ – and there is some evidence against this long-
held proposition (Shapiro 2011)), it is differentially enabled. Once enabled, it is
also differentially maintained by how the cell repairs, eliminates, or regulates the
change (Martincorena et al. 2012). Thus a directedness does appear in the conse-
quent types of mutations that remain stable in the organism. So, when genetic
engineering involves the silencing of these regulatory mechanisms in order to
encourage Bproper^ expression of the transgene, the directed (i.e. non-random or
the source of apparent teleology) part of the emergence of novelty in the organism
has been tampered with. Genetic engineering thereby risks reifying the ontological
assumption that mutation occurs without context and that the organism’s semiotic
activity plays no role in the outcome, each which validates the acontextual
Genetic Engineering and Human Mental Ecology
randomness of the genetic intervention – or rather the assumption that the only
true source of context is that provided by humans.15
Heidegger (1977) explored the phenomenological dimension of this essentially
cybernetic fact in his description of how technologies conceal the poeisis of nature
by organizing it so that it serve purposes set by humans. The technology then
reveals the world as ordered by an anthropomorphic causality which subsequently
informs the thinking of the human experiencing it. An increasingly technological
world is continually re-established as the new normal by those living within it,
entrenching means-end rationality as the mode by which phenomena in the world
come to appear. In the case of genetic engineering, the organism has not simply
become the Bstanding reserve^ Heidegger feared as exemplary of the dangerous
mutual ordering of technology and thinking.16 Indeed, the mental reconstruction of
our understanding of life, such that we see its form, its physiology and its
behaviour as now parts moulded and recircuited, represents a much more signif-
icant form of ordering than Heidegger imagined. Biology, the study of life, has
transformed into the study of exploitable biological information, a shift ripe with
ethical and political consequences (Pandilovski 2012). Under such a paradigm, it
can now be proposed – unfacetiously – that humans engineer animals for ethical
reasons, exemplified in the suggestion that factory-farmed animals be re-ordered
to no longer suffer from our ordering impositions: Bwould it not be positively right
to breed, or engineer, [a chicken] as a deaf, blind, featherless, legless, anence-
phalic lump that we could not injure further?^ (Clark 1998: 217). Further, bio-
technology is based on the reconstruction of life, but because it is concerned with
modifying heredity, ultimately evolution. The massive spatial presence of the
means-end conversion of a river into a hydroelectric dam that so haunted
Heidegger has now found a rival in the even more massive temporal presence of
diverting the evolutionary processes of life by means-end thinking, with future
effects as boggling as the scales of time it took to get life to the stage it is at today.
Problems are identified by industry, which then develops the technologies to solve
them. The rate and pace by which ecological systems Bsolve^ problems is eclipsed by
the rate of change of industrial research and development. Beyond the food crops that
form the basis of activists’ pitted attacks, many wild species are engineered in labs for
possible release into the wild, including mosquitoes, forest trees, etc. As the biological
diversity of ecosystems plummets, bioethicists debate whether society is morally
obligated to create biological diversity to replace what has been lost (Boldt 2013), a
position embodied in Brand (02013)17 vision of bringing back wooly mammoths and
other species decimated since the dawn of the Pleistocene.
15 Wills (2004) notes that the spatiotemporal context of genes and of organisms is crucial in Maori culture. He
argues that the genes are located in organisms within a particular ecology and at a particular historical moment
in a genealogy, and that there is an intrinsic value in this situatedness insofar as it manifests the co-evolving
relatedness of biological processes and their co-dependence for survival. When we indiscriminately Binvade
natural genealogies we have started reducing the ordered tree of life to a twisted heap of broken twigs.^ Wills
therefore believes that genetically engineered organisms should be confined to laboratory conditions.
16 See Heidegger’s (1977) discussion of the conversion of a river’s water into a standing reserve through the
development of hydroelectricity.
17 Date in a format Brand would approve of.
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Educators need to be pre-emptive against the possibility that innovation and com-
plexity in the biological world is shadowed by the creativity of humans, because the
process is at risk of Batesonian self-validation. Biotech inventions are foregrounded,
natural Binventions^ go extinct; the small genetic changes Bwe^ make are highlighted,
the larger genomic, cellular, and ecological contexts that our experiments are dependent
upon are backgrounded. If we agree that humanity needs to experience the creative and
spontaneous self-arising of a process that is bigger than us (Bonnett 2016), then we
should pause and consider the experiential dimension quietly silenced under the cloak
of human purpose.
Consider the recent BGlowing Plants^ project on Kickstarter,18 intending to engineer
glow-in-the-dark trees to replace street lamps. People would see such a tree and be
dazzled by the ingenuity of the scientist, clouding the fact that the phenotypic changes
experienced are themselves natural inventions (i.e. humans did not create the firefly
gene; horizontal gene transfer; the tree’s metabolism, semiotic activity, or transcription
machinery; the capacity for retinas to be triggered by wave frequencies, and our brain to
transform it into the experience of light; our ability to experience amazement, etc.). It
then requires much pedagogical effort to uncover from underneath the human Bbling^
the complexity that humans remain dependent on in order to regain that sense of awe
and humility before the world. This flies in the face of an educational approach more
consonant with Bateson’s insights: that we are called upon to develop a sense of
reverence for life through practices that nurture what Rud calls Ba sense that there is
something larger than a human being, accompanied by capacities for awe, respect, and
shame^ (Rud 2011: 55). Indeed science can be employed to uncover the profound ways
in which humans are interconnected with and dependent upon the complex processes of
the natural world. But it can also instrumentalize the natural world by turning it into
machines and resources, making it appear as serving human purposes and therefore
subordinate to our power. This latter capacity tends to be parasitic upon the former one
indicating that humans must be ever-vigilant in questioning to what extent such an
instrumentalization is necessary, as well as to what extent educators need to develop
cultural practices that can compensate for this instrumentalization by foregrounding
that which is still able to instigate a sense of reverence-worthy self-arising natural
process. According to Bonnett (2016) this is what we must sustain and what must be
integral to any concept of sustainability.
For Barnes and Dupré (2008), the sense that we are mastering the master molecule
has given rise to both the excitement and the profound anxiety about what genetic
engineering means for society and life on earth. They suggest that we de-hype the
molecule. This seems like sage semiotic advice. But it does not seem like the hype is
easy to overcome, considering it is entwined in multiple processes, identities, and
economies. It is likely that the paradoxical tension is here to stay unless we explicitly
engage with it. It is a pedagogical question how to frame genetic engineering. If
educators conclude that mental ecologies require buffering of hubristic thinking, and
that this can come about through acknowledging that we live in systems more complex
than we conceive, then explicitly highlighting side effects of genetic engineering should
be an educational priority (Affifi 2016). Such unintended consequences need to be
brought to attention regardless of whether they are malignant or benign. Research that
18 Visit their project website here: http://www.glowingplant.com/
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uncovers unintended consequences can come from omic studies, 19 behavioural or
physiological studies, and ecological studies, all which will reveal the novel products
and interactions of genetic intervention on different biological and ecological scales.
For example, a proteomic study of Monsanto’s MON 810 maize revealed that dozens
of protein changes result from up or down regulation of other genes as a result of the
inserted genes (Zolla et al. 2008). These changes are not likely dangerous, but they
were not predicted or desired. The problem is that it currently does not serve industry to
communicate the extent of benign side effects so such studies are often claimed to be
unnecessary or misleading (Lay and Liyanage 2006).
Humans are faced with a dilemma. If the uncertainty, pleiotropy, context-specificity,
and semiotic activity of the process is acknowledged, we save ourselves from an
undesirable mental ecology that comes from living in a world that we believe is
genetically controllable. The indeterministic creative aspect of the complex system is
foregrounded. However, what is lost is assurance that the process is definitely safe or
well-understood. For industry, the pedagogical choice is obvious: given that biotech-
nology depends on grants and stock shares, the industry will not likely seek to protect
this sense that even the engineered system is Blarger than we are.^ They will probably
continue to develop GMOs based on genes that have less visible side effects and will
continue opting for the irrelevance of studies that would reveal the unexpected dimen-
sions of intervention. Funding for and marketing of products requires entrenching the
impression of a successfully controlled and manipulated nature.20 However, educators
need to recognize that the way in which genetic engineering discourse emphasizes the
concept of control while silencing the empirical significance of uncertainty has much
bigger semiotic impacts than merely ensuring the economic success of a company. A
transparent and comprehensive exploration of the side effects of genetic engineering on
all scales, from the biochemical to the ecological, but also its semiotic dimensions
within human mental ecologies, would emphasize uncertainty, protect from the run-
away effects of hubris, and thereby ensure that those genetic interventions society
decides to pursue are not taken lightly.
********
I have said that these four factors are interlocking, but I will not show all the possible
interrelations between them. One could say that these four factors are themselves
pleiotropic, and are more or less separable as factors depending on the actual
19 BOmic^ refers to a set of ways of analyzing gene products (Heinemann et al. (2011). It includes
transcriptomics (the analysis of the RNA transcripts), proteomics (the analysis of protein products), and
metabolomics (the analysis of metabolites). Omic studies can give an exhaustive list of such products at a
given point in the organism’s ongoing development, which can then be compared with results from a wild
organism at a similar developmental stage and environmental circumstance.
20 While the attempt to control heredity underpins commericalization, an opposite undercurrent is found in
pure research. As synthetic biology and the artificial life research program move towards creating life, it has
been observed that the design challenge is now to build something that is capable of novelty and spontaneity,
which are seen as key attributes of living systems (Dupuy 2013). The irony here is that our tinkering with other
organisms’ genomes is motivated by a desire for precision (for the organism to respond to the interventions in
deterministic ways), while the aim of artificial life is to take what we think of as (more or less) deterministic
inanimate matter and breathe indeterminacy into it. Success would be measured by the extent to which the
engineered organism resists the application of the word Bengineered^.
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sociocultural conditions that occur and differentiate them. However, I will name a few
linkages. I think it is easy to see that the habituation to exposure of GMOs lessens our
general concern the logic that sustains their continued development, that part of this
logic is eugenic reasoning and a reductionistic abstraction of the function of genes, and
that all these processes are further stimulated by our reduced acquaintance with the
creativity and generativity of nonhuman (semiotic) processes, which are in turn
camouflaged by the rearrangements of our mental and physical environments that
genetic engineering progressively affords. The process works in reverse too.
Producing technologies based on the assumptions of genetic reductionism stimulate
the idea that its logic is correct, which itself stokes hubris by positioning humans more
confidently as the knowing and able exploiters of the universe’s intricate secrets. As the
complex interconnections between the genome and cellular and environmental factors
face a diminishing role in the production of novelty, humanity is further entrenched as
that factor responsible for redirecting the process for eugenic improvement all the while
circumventing the need to understand these very processes.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that these progressively mutually reinforcing
feedback loops collapse. Indeed, it is the nature of positive feedback loops that we
should anticipate this at some time. Genetic engineering could lead to a significant
catastrophe that casts doubt on the patterns of thought and behaviour connected with it.
Controversial risk analysts Taleb et al. (2014) suggest that even if current safety
regulations ensure it vastly unlikely that any single release of a GMO will cause
significant ecological harm, the continued release of an increasing number of GMOs
magnifies greatly the likelihood that at some point a large-scale event leading to regional
or global harm will occur. As pointed out earlier, if these events are not catastrophic,
unanticipated side effects will cause temporary doubt in the biotech project and may add
reactionary oversight to the regulation process but the momentum of the industry and its
integration into society will likely mean that we continue betting against the probability
of a more serious future calamity. On the other hand, if the consequences lead to non-
recoverable (at least on any normal human scale) ecological ruin, as these authors
predict is plausible, we would likely undergo a serious re-evaluation. The destabilizing
effects on ecosystems might become severe enough that they lead to a correction of the
pathological mental ecology that brought them about, to a realization and felt awareness
of that Bsomething bigger^ that Rud described as so key to a sense of reverence. In this
way, the temporary runaway destruction in biological systems would trigger a negative
feedback effect balancing our hubris. However, this extreme case would cause much
suffering and impoverishment to human and other worlds. It is outside of pedagogical
consideration however much it eventually proved Beducative^ in terms of improving our
ontological assumptions about our place in the scheme of things.
Implications for Educators
Throughout this article, I have assumed that readers of this journal are all explicitly or
implicitly science educators and I have made some suggestions for helping understand
the consequences of genetic engineering as a way of thinking. In this section, I will
summarize and expand on these suggestions. The suggestions outlined here are based
on the assumption that unless educators develop specific strategies to limit the types of
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thinking normalized through living in a world composed through genetic engineering,
society will be unable to make decisions appropriate for avoiding some of this
trajectory’s undesirable consequences. The goal of education here is to develop ways
of thinking that work to interfere or limit the growth of 1) the engineering metaphor as
applied to life, 2) the concept of programming organisms, 3) the concept of
Bimproving^ living organisms, including humans, and 4) the relocation and concentra-
tion of creativity within human activity. There are undoubtedly other types of thinking
normalized through these technologies deserving further study.
Educational implications can be divided into goals and objectives for educators. The
overall educational goal is to ensure that society more deeply understands the actual
and potential impacts of genetic engineering and is able to use this understanding to
critically, responsively, and democratically decide on the role which genetic engineer-
ing takes. The actual and potential impacts, this paper argues, are not limited to direct
effects on health or the biosphere, but also involve semiotic effects within the ecology
of ideas that contextualize human thought and action (and which may then lead to
health or biospheric effects). In order to meet this educational goal, specific objectives
depend upon the extent to which genetic engineering has already come to affect human
mental ecologies. If people are already habituated to the notions described in this paper,
then different pedagogical approaches will be needed than would be the case were
educators instead seeking to be preemptive against habituation to ideas not yet nor-
malized. I shall address these specific challenges in a moment, but will first of all point
out that in both cases it seems that a better understanding of the behaviour of genetic
engineering ideas in human mental ecology is necessary, prompting the need to foster
general public understanding of 1) the nature of genetic engineering ideas, and 2), the
ecological nature of thought, including how thought processes constitute and consti-
tuted by the material worlds humans inhabit.
Understanding the particular effects of genetic engineering ideas on mental ecology
requires a better understanding of the limitations inherent in the engineering, program-
ming, and reductionistic metaphors; a better understanding of the nature of the genes
and genetic information in light of widespread advances in genomics and the emerging
paradigm which understands information as constituted by complex mental interactions
between genes, organisms, and environments.
Understanding the ecological nature of thought requires increased familiarity with
basic ecological ideas such as positive and negative feedback, and hierarchical governance
of feedback by higher order feedback. Some areas of the biological sciences are already
modelled in these ways, so it would make sense for educators to help students familiarize
with ecological phenomena in these fields first. Many examples are available in biology
textbooks, such as the circularity of the carbon cycle and the hierarchical governance of
genes by other genes (such as the standard example of Hox genes illustrates). However,
biology textbooks just as often present linear slices of circular systems, and do not
emphasize that circularity is an inherent and necessary aspect of the causality of living
systems. For this reason, educators need to constantly emphasize that linear representa-
tions of living systems are isolated for pragmatic purposes and are not representative of the
causal nature of the phenomena. Once the capacity to perceive and understand circular
systems has become itself a habit of thought, it will be easier to apply this type of thinking
to understanding the slightly more abstract cases of ecological relations amongst ideas and
systems of circulating differences. At this point, it is beneficial to cultivate a self-reflective
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understanding of how these feedback relations exist within human mental activity and not
just in external biological ecosystems, a general understanding of how these mental
ecologies affect and are affected by environments, technologies, and the like, and finally,
an understanding that cultures have developed ways of tempering potentially destructive
positive feedback in their own mental ecologies through cultivating higher order belief
structures such as those we find in religion.
Our educational challenge is then to help people understand more specifically how
ideas about genetic engineering interact in mental ecologies, and this paper has
attempted a preliminary tracing of how such ideas may interact. Simply knowing such
interactions is, however, in itself of little value. The point is to understand the actual and
potential consequences of these interactions, to redflag those we do not desire, and to
make interventions into these mental ecologies to sidestep side effects. This is inher-
ently a pedagogical activity as it involves consciously taking responsibility for how
such ideas interact. On the one hand, the educator is then tasked with assisting students
in developing skills by which to take responsibility for and transform their mental
ecologies such that they may be more sustainable. On the other hand, the educator, as
one with a greater awareness of such effects and the tools by which to avert them, is
also responsible for curating experiences that can assist students in avoiding detrimental
effects while students are in the process of developing the skills to avoid them on their
own. It is in this latter context that educators have to deal with different cases
depending on the extent to which genetic engineering ideas have incorporated them-
selves into the mental ecologies of their students.
In the case that such ideas are new and only beginning to expand in students’
ecologies of ideas, a number of concrete strategies can be adopted. First of all, we can
limit our exposure to organisms we consider to be engineered. Even though many
parents currently limit their children’s access to violence on television because they are
aware that violence may become normalized, we do not often approach new technol-
ogies with an eye on how the metaphors that they reify could be affecting both adults
and children. An obvious objection to this suggestion however is that it reproduces the
same problem as hidden clearcuts, slaughterhouses, and other practices that activists
work to make more transparent and is therefore potentially a regressive suggestion.
An alternative approach would be to expose where and how the engineering
metaphor (and the concepts it seems to depend on) does not work. The transgenic or
gene edited organism has not been deterministically reorganized, complex uncertainties
are still there, and Bnature^ (as in that which is not imposed teleologically by humans)
is still present even throughout these modifications. As noted, industry has reasons for
limiting public awareness of such uncertainties even when they are not likely harmful
for the environment of human health. However, pedagogically, it is likely necessary to
bite the bullet and risk increasing the public’s apprehension of such technologies in
order to eventually arrive at a place where the decisions if or when to genetically
engineer are made with care and foresight.
A third strategy is to make sure that the presence and nature of wild organisms is
accentuated in different ways in students’ experience. On its own, this strategy is likely
insufficient as well, unless it is accompanied by experiential and theoretical work that
can open people to appreciating the natural world in deeper ways. This is because while
an engineering mentality may not pervade students’ attitudes towards other species,
their mental ecologies may still be interlocking a prior set of limiting ideas about what
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nature is and is capable of. In particular, providing educational experiences that draw
out organisms as active interpretive agencies is seen as crucial.
A fourth strategy would be to reconstruct the language used when speaking about
and engaging in genetic engineering.
A fifth strategy might be to foster types of ideas that can help keep in check ideas
that would become deleterious if allowed to go into runaway. Bateson noted that
healthy ecologies have positive feedback loops and that while these are important for
the generativity of the system, it is also necessary that they be governed by other loops.
An instrumental or an atomistic attitude towards other organisms may sometimes be
necessary but we need a set of ways of undercutting this way of thinking once it starts
to dominate the mental ecology. Bateson suggests that such higher order regulation
traditionally came from religion but that a contemporary version could come from
ecology and cybernetics. He also insisted that art was capable of integrating conscious-
ness into the larger cybernetic mind (that it keeps forgetting it is only a component of),
and is therefore necessary for fostering a visceral awareness of the limitations that
consciousness has in creative process.
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